USA v. Lewis by unknown
2008 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
7-8-2008 
USA v. Lewis 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Lewis" (2008). 2008 Decisions. 884. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2008/884 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2008 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
Case No:  07-1834
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
       v.
  JEVON LEWIS,
                Appellant
                                               
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
District Court No. 05-CR-00034
District Judge: The Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno
                                               
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 1, 2008
Before: RENDELL, SMITH, 
and FISHER, Circuit Judges
(Filed: July 8, 2008)
                                               
OPINION
                                               
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
On June 29, 2005, a jury found Jevon Lewis guilty of possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).  The District Court sentenced
Lewis on March 16, 2007, to 87 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised
      The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  This Court has1
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
2
release.  This timely appeal followed.1
Lewis advances four arguments on appeal.  The two primary issues are whether:
(1) the evidence offered at trial was sufficient to support Lewis’s conviction for unlawful
possession of a firearm, and (2) the District Court abused its discretion by limiting the
scope of cross-examination.  Because we conclude that the evidence was sufficient for the
jury to convict and that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in limiting the scope
of cross-examination, we will affirm Lewis’s conviction.  Lewis’s other two
contentions—that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional, and that his due process
rights were violated when the District Court applied a preponderance of the evidence
standard for facts relevant to a sentence enhancement—are raised only to preserve the
issues for possible Supreme Court review.  See United States v. Singletary, 268 F.3d 196
(3d Cir. 2001) (holding § 922(g)(1) is constitutional); United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d
556 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc) (holding that a preponderance of the evidence standard
applies when determining facts relevant to sentencing).  We, therefore, undertake no
further discussion of these claims.
I.
The evidence against Lewis was sufficient as a matter of law to support his
conviction.  This Court employs a deferential standard of review to sufficiency of the
      Section 922(g)(1) reads, “It shall be unlawful for any person . . . who has been2
convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one
year . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting
commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which
has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.”
3
evidence challenges.  United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1080 (3d Cir. 1996).  “It is not
for us to weigh the evidence or to determine the credibility of the witnesses.  The verdict
of a jury must be sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable
to the Government, to support it.”  Id. (citation omitted).  The substantial evidence
standard is met where “‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements
of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”  Id. (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
319 (1979)).  The two essential elements of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) are prior conviction of
a felony and possession of a firearm.   At trial, the parties stipulated to Lewis’s prior2
felony conviction; thus, the jury needed only to determine the element of possession.
While there were inconsistencies in the police officers’ testimony, all four officers
testified that Lewis was in possession of a firearm.  This Court adheres to the well-
established principle that witness credibility determinations must be made by the jury. 
United States v. Giampa, 758 F.2d 928, 935 (3d Cir. 1985) (citing United States v.
Cravero, 530 F.2d 666, 670 (5th Cir. 1976)).  Only in the rare circumstance that
testimony is “unbelievable on its face” should an appellate court overturn a jury verdict
due to insufficient evidence.  Cravero, 530 F.2d at 670; see United States v. Hunter, 145
F.3d 946, 949–50 (7th Cir. 1998) (limiting judicial review of credibility determinations to
      We admonish counsel for Lewis for attempting to use a post-trial letter from a juror3
to impeach the verdict in clear violation of Fed. R. Evid. 606(b).  See United States v.
Lloyd, 269 F.3d 228, 237 (3d Cir. 2001).
4
“the rare case in which it was physically impossible for the witness to observe that which
he claims occurred, or impossible under the laws of nature for the occurrence to have
taken place at all”) (quotation omitted).
We disagree with Lewis’s assertion that the conflicting testimony of the police
officers rises to the level of creating an impossible event.  This Court’s independent
review of the factual record reveals that a rational jury could have found that Lewis was
in possession of a firearm.  The jury’s unanimous conviction of Lewis is also probative of
this determination.   Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence offered at trial was3
sufficient to support Lewis’s conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm.
II.
Lewis also claims that the District Court’s ruling during trial to limit the scope of
cross-examination of Officer Elkins violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront a
witness.  This Court analyzes the limitation on cross-examination of a witness under an
abuse of discretion standard.  United States v. Mussare, 405 F.3d 161, 169 (3d Cir. 2005)
(citation omitted) (“[A] district court retains ‘wide latitude . . . to impose reasonable
limits on cross-examination to avoid . . . harassment, prejudice, confusion of [the] issues .
. . or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.’”) (quoting Delaware v.
Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986)).  This Court will only conclude that the district
      During the April 7, 2005 suppression hearing, Officer Elkins testified that he had4
never been the subject of either an investigation or a complaint alleging “excessive
force.”  Elkins further testified that he had never been the subject of a complaint alleging
“police brutality.”  At the time of this testimony, he was the subject of a citizen complaint
alleging “physical abuse” resulting from a September 2004 incident. Officer Elkins, along
with the four other officers involved, were exonerated before Lewis’s trial began.
5
court abused its discretion if “no reasonable person would adopt the district court’s
view.”  United States v. Frazier, 469 F.3d 85, 88 (3d Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted).
The District Court held extensive discussions with counsel regarding the
permissible scope of inquiry into prior allegations of Elkins’ use of force.   Lewis sought4
to cross-examine Elkins regarding the facts surrounding the allegations.  The District
Court emphasized the need for confining the scope of cross-examination “to avoid mini-
trials on peripheral or irrelevant matters.”  Therefore, the Judge allowed limited cross-
examination regarding a narrow issue—the accuracy of Elkins’ prior testimony at the
suppression hearing.  This Court’s precedent clearly establishes a judge’s broad discretion
to exclude collateral matters.  United States v. Casoni, 950 F.2d 893, 919 (3d Cir. 1991). 
We conclude that the Judge acted reasonably in excluding irrelevant and potentially
confusing testimony.  Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
